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Abstract 
 
We present results from a novel experiment on the effect of a policy 
designed to encourage cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game. We find 
that the effect of this policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it 
was chosen democratically by the subjects than when it was exogenously 
imposed. This difference remains after controlling for selection (those that 
choose the policy may be more likely to be affected by it). We conclude that 
the treatment effect of policies may depend on whether they are endogenous 
or exogenous to the society on which they are imposed. Therefore, 
democratic institutions may have an effect on behavior in addition to the 
effect in terms of policy choice. More generally, our findings have 
implications for empirical studies of treatment effects in other contexts: the 
effect of a treatment may depend on whether it is endogenous or exogenous. 
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Introduction 
  The study of institutions is key to our understanding of the determinants of 
economic performance (see North 1981, La Porta et al. 1998, Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001, and Easterly and Levine 2003 among others). The focus of this paper is 
democratic institutions. The central idea is that democratic institutions may have a direct 
or intrinsic effect on behavior in addition to their instrumental effect by helping choose 
different policies. The same policy may have different effects depending on whether it 
was democratically selected or not.  
  While the idea that democracy may influence the effect of policies can be traced 
back at least to Tocqueville (1838),
2 our contribution consists on identifying this effect of 
democracy. We present results from a series of experiments designed to determine 
whether a policy that was exogenously imposed has the same effect as the same policy 
when it is democratically (that is, endogenously) chosen. In these experiments, subjects 
participate in several prisoners’ dilemma games and may choose, by simple majority, to 
establish a policy that could encourage cooperation. This policy consists of a fine on 
unilateral defection, which transforms the game into a coordination game in which both 
mutual defection and mutual cooperation are Nash equilibria. In some cases the 
experimental software randomly overrides the votes of the subjects and randomly 
imposes, or not, the policy. Before proceeding to play again with either the original or the 
modified payoffs, the subjects are informed both of whether payoffs are modified and 
whether it was decided by their vote or by the computer.  This setup allows us to compare 
the behavior of individuals and groups that voted in the same way and were presented 
with the same game (coordination versus prisoner’s dilemma) but differed by whether the 
game was chosen endogenously (democratically chosen by the subjects) or exogenously 
(randomly chosen by the computer). 
  The results show that the effect of the policy (i.e., the fine) on the percentage of 
cooperative actions is greater when it is democratically chosen by the subjects 
(endogenous) than when it is imposed by the computer (exogenous). This difference 
remains even after accounting for selection; that is, subjects that choose the policy may, 
for example, be more likely to value cooperative behavior and cooperate after a 
modification. Our results suggest that the treatment effect of a policy (that is its causal 
impact on behavior) may depend on whether it is democratically chosen or not. This 
                                                 
2 “It is not always feasible to consult the whole people, either directly or indirectly, in the formation of the 
law; but it cannot be denied that, when such a measure is possible, the authority of the law is much 
augmented. This popular origin, which impairs the excellence and wisdom of legislation, contributes 
prodigiously to increase its power.” Tocqueville (1838), pag. 228. On other theories stating that political 
participation is intrinsically beneficial see Pateman (1970), Thompson (1970), and Finkel (1985).   3
implies that the same policy may have different effects depending on whether it was 
democratically selected or autocratically imposed. 
   The observed difference in experimental outcomes between exogenous and 
endogenous policies is consistent with evidence from field settings. Bardhan (2000) finds 
that farmers are less likely to violate irrigation rules when they themselves have crafted 
those rules. Frey (1998) finds that Swiss cantons with greater democratic participation 
face lower tax evasion. A literature on worker participation in workplace decisions finds 
that such participation positively affects productivity provided that some of the material 
gains also accrue to the workers (see Levine and Tyson 1990, and Bonin, Jones and 
Putterman 1993). While these findings from the field suggest that democratic institutions 
may affect cooperative behavior, they can also be explained by unobservable 
characteristics of the actors that affect both the degree of democratic decision making and 
individual behavior. In contrast, our experimental design allows us to control for potential 
unobservable characteristics by comparing groups and individuals that were both 
exogenously formed and who voted in the same way. An emergent literature in 
development economics on the effects of local democracy (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 
2005, and Besley, Pande and Rao 2005) has also paid attention to plausibly exogenous 
sources of variation in democracy but has largely ignored the possible intrinsic effects of 
democratic institutions.
3 
There are extensive literatures considering the role of rewards and punishments in 
games
4 and exploring the effect of voting on the availability of rewards and punishments 
in voluntary contribution games.
5 This second literature studies the total effect of 
democratically allowing for rewards and punishments. For example, Sutter, Haigner and 
Kocher (2005) find that rewards and punishments are more effective when they are 
allowed democratically, and call this a “democratic participation rights premium.” 
However, their results could be due to unobservable characteristics affecting both how 
groups vote and their response to rewards and punishments. In contrast, our experimental 
design allows us to separate the total effect of a policy into a selection effect (due to 
differences across groups that vote differently) and a treatment effect (the real causal 
                                                 
3 Our results are also related to the social psychology literature on procedural justice (see for example 
Thibaut and Walker 1975 and Lind and Tyler 1988). This literature has shown that subjects’ evaluation of a 
given outcome may depend on the fairness of the procedures that have led to that outcome. An important 
element studied in this literature is whether subjects have an opportunity to express their opinions during 
the procedure (on “voice” see Folger 1977 and van den Bos 1999). Our work contributes to this literature 
by showing that procedural justice can help us understand the effects of democracy. 
4 See e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000), Falkinger et al. (2000), and Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003). 
5 See e.g., Botelho, et al. (2005), Ertan, Page and Putterman (2005), and Sutter, Haigner and Kocher 
(2005); see also the related work by Charness, Fréchette and Qin (2006).   4
effect) and to study how the treatment effect varies depending on whether the policy was 
democratically chosen or exogenously imposed. There is also an extensive experimental 
literature on the issue of cooperation and its determinants.  Many experimental studies 
have focused on the conditions that affect cooperation (see Kagel and Roth 1995 for a 
survey of the literature). Palfrey (2005) provides a useful survey of the experimental 
literature on voting.  
Our findings have two main implications. The first is that democratic institutions 
may affect not only the types of policies adopted but also the impact of a given policy, so 
that a policy democratically selected by one group of people will not have the same effect 
when imposed on another group. The second implication relates to the study of treatment 
effects more generally. Much applied work in economics seeks to identify the treatment 
effect of policies, institutions, or products. Since people usually choose their policies, 
institutions and purchases, it is necessary to account for selection into treatment to 
measure the “true” treatment effect (i.e. one that does not reflect selection). Based on 
such estimates, policy recommendations may be made that involve assigning the 
treatment without choice (that is, exogenously). If the treatment effect differs based on 
whether it is exogenously or endogenously determined such policy recommendations 
may be unwarranted.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
In each experimental session, subjects participate anonymously through 
computers.
6 The subjects are randomly divided into groups of four for the entire session. 
Groups consist of four subjects so as to maximize the probability of a tie in the voting 
stage that is described below. Each session consist of two parts. In part 1, subjects play 
10 rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma game in Table 1 (Initial Payoffs).
7 The exchange 
rate is 50 points for one dollar. After each round each subject is randomly matched with 
another subject in his or her group for the next round. In part 2 of the experiment the 
subjects play 10 rounds as in part 1 but the payoffs can be modified to the payoffs in 
Table 1 (Modified Payoffs). The modification of payoffs consists of imposing a tax or 
fine on unilateral defection. While under the initial payoffs the unique Nash equilibrium 
is mutual defection, under the modified payoffs both mutual defection and mutual 
cooperation are Nash equilibria. 
 
                                                 
6 we adapted the Multistage software by SSEL-Caltech/CASSEL-UCLA. 
7 For neutrality, the actions C and D are denoted as 1 and 2 in the experimental sessions.   5
Table 1: Stage Game Payoffs (in points) 
Initial Payoffs  Modified Payoffs 
 Other’s  action 
Own 
action 
 C  D 
C 50  10 
D 60  40 
   
 Other’s  action 
Own 
action 
 C  D 
C 50  10 
D 48  40 
     
 
  Whether the payoffs are modified in the policy selection stage was determined as 
follows. First, subjects vote on whether to modify payoffs. Second, the computer 
randomly chooses whether to consider the votes in each group. If the computer considers 
the votes, then the majority wins and in case of a tie the computer breaks the tie. If the 
computer does not consider the votes in a group, it randomly chooses whether to modify 
payoffs or not in that group. The voting stage is summarized in Figure 1.  The subjects’ 
computer screens inform them whether the computer randomly chose to consider the 
votes and whether payoffs were modified. The subjects do not learn the exact distribution 
of votes, including whether the computer needed to break a tie. We denote the four 
possible outcomes of the voting stage as GroupMod, GroupNot, CompMod and 
CompNot, where Group denotes that the votes of the group were considered, Comp 
denotes that the computer overrode the group and Mod denotes that payoffs were 
modified versus Not. After the voting stage, the subjects play 10 more rounds with other 
subjects in their group, with the payoff matrix depending on the results from the policy 
selection stage. 
After the ten rounds in part 2, the subjects answer a series of questions that allow 
us to assess the subjects’ understanding of the experimental design and their reasoning in 
the voting stage and after. In addition we ask them for personal characteristics such as: 
academic major, class, math and verbal SAT scores,
8 political philosophy. These 
questions allow us to study how personal characteristics affect the voting decisions and 
the impact of the policy. Finally, the subjects participate in a “beauty contest” game in 
order to gauge their strategic sophistication.
9 
                                                 
8 We believe that the self reported SAT scores can be trusted since Palacios Huerta (2003) found no 
misreporting of SAT scores among Brown undergraduates in a previous experiment. 
9 Each subject chose a number between zero and one hundred and the subject with the closest number to 
two thirds of the average of all numbers in the group earns 100 points. The unique Nash equilibrium of this 
game is to choose zero. See Bosch-Domènech, et al. (2002) and reference therein.   6
We present next a short theoretical analysis of the game subjects play in this 
experiment. First, note that under the initial payoffs (prisoner’s dilemma game) there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium in the stage game which is inefficient: both players play D. 
Second, under the modified payoffs (coordination game) there are two Nash equilibria in 
pure strategies, an efficient and an inefficient one: CC and DD. Since in the experiment 
there are a finite number of repetitions and in addition subjects are randomly re-matched 
after each round we expect that predictions from the one-shot games are valid also for the 
finite repetition (see Duffy and Ochs 2003). 
How should subjects vote? While modified payoffs allow subjects to cooperate in 
equilibrium, mutual defection remains an equilibrium outcome. As such, if subjects 
expect to coordinate in mutual defection under modified payoffs, they have no incentive 
to vote for modification. Sub-game perfection does not provide a prediction regarding 
vote behavior. The optimal vote depends on subjects’ expectation of behavior under the 
modified payoffs game. Subjects that expect to achieve mutual cooperation under 
modified payoffs should vote for modification. On the contrary, subjects that expect no 
change in behavior under modified payoffs have little incentives to vote for 
modification.
10 
Will subjects coordinate in the efficient outcome under modified payoffs? While 
under the modified payoffs the efficient outcome is an equilibrium, subjects may not 
necessarily coordinate on it. Previous experimental literature has shown the difficulty of 
coordinating on the efficient equilibrium in coordination games. For example Cooper et 
al. (1990) and Van Huyck et al. (1990), among others, have shown that in experimental 
coordination games subject may coordinate on the “safer” equilibrium over the efficient 
one. In our experiment, cooperation is optimal for a subject only if the partner cooperates 
with a probability higher than 30/32. Mutual cooperation is not very robust to uncertainty 
over others’ behavior. For this reason, we may observe that subject coordinate on mutual 
defection under modified payoffs. However, prior behavior may affect behavior in the 
current game.
11 In this case, having the subjects choose to modify payoffs may affect the 
equilibrium selection process in the resulting coordination game. Knowing that the 
coordination game was chosen by the group may increase the probability that the 
efficient equilibrium becomes focal. 
                                                 
10 Off equilibrium reasoning can justify voting for modification even for a defector. The reason is that if 
modification results in an increase in cooperation, a defector will obtain a higher profit. As such, voting for 
modification may be part of a “bait” strategy. 
11 See the literature on forward induction (Kohlberg and Mertens 1986, and van Damme 1989) and related 
experimental literature (Cooper et al. 1992, Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 1993, and Cachon and Camerer 
1996). Note however that forward induction, as defined, has no bite in the game we analyze.   7
 
3. Experimental Results 
We conducted 18 experimental sessions from May to November 2006 in a 
computer lab at Brown University. A total of 276 subjects participated in the experiment, 
with an average of 15 subjects per session. The subjects were Brown University 
undergraduates recruited through advertisement in university web pages and signs posted 
on campus. Table 2 shows some data on the characteristics of subjects. Of the subjects, 
13% indicated that they were majoring in economics. The class distribution in the 
experiment is somewhat younger than on campus with the mode on sophomore. The 
average self reported SAT scores are 725 and 723, for math and verbal respectively. The 
reported political philosophy of the subjects is on average “liberal.” A high number of 
subjects correctly answered the questions regarding the experiment suggesting that the 
experimental design was clear to the subjects. For example, more than 90% of the 
subjects remembered correctly the result from the voting stage. The subjects earned an 
average of $24.57, with a maximum of $29.40 and a minimum of $17.60. 
  The level of cooperation was 18% in the first part of the experiment. The level of 
cooperation was decreasing with experience, with a maximum of 31.9% in round 1 and a 
minimum of 6.9% in round 10 (the last round of part 1). Both the level and evolution of 
cooperation in this experiment are similar to those on other experiments on prisoner’s 
dilemma games (see for example Cooper et al. 1996, Bereby-Meyer and Roth 2006, Dal 
Bó 2005, and Aoyagi and Fréchette 2003); they also resemble those in the voluntary 
contributions mechanism literature (Ledyard 1995). 
 
3.1. Results from the voting stage 
  Of the 276 subjects, 147 (53.26%) voted to modify payoffs and 129 (46.74%) 
voted not to modify payoffs in the second part of the experiment. Voting for modification 
(votemod) is positively and significantly correlated with the math SAT scores and 
negatively and significantly correlated with the number provided in the “beauty contest” 
game – see Table 3. This suggests that both cognitive ability and strategic sophistication 
are related to voting for modification of payoffs. Surprisingly neither the class, the 
political philosophy nor the major are correlated with the voting decisions. Voting 
depends on the subjects’ experience in the first part of the experiment. Subjects that 
cooperated more and those that faced little cooperation are more likely to vote for 
modification.    8
  The fact that a large proportion of subjects (46%) voted to remain in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game is of interest and has implications for the large political economy 
literature on inefficient polices and delayed reforms.
12 This experiment shows that 
subjects will not necessarily vote for reforms that may make efficient behavior incentive 
compatible. On the one hand, it may be that some subjects fail to understand the structure 
of incentives in the game and how the modification of payoffs would change the set of 
equilibrium actions. On the other hand, subjects may believe that making mutual 
cooperation an equilibrium is not enough for it to arise. 
  We define the variable voteshare as the number of votes in favor of modification 
of payoffs in a group. This variable ranges from 0 to 4. The mode of the distribution of 
this variable is 2, which is optimal for the analysis of the effects of modifications. Figure 
2 shows the observed cumulative distribution function of voteshare (solid line) and the 
distribution that would arise if subjects decide their votes independently of each other 
(binomial, depicted as a dashed line). As Figure 2 shows there is little difference between 
the two distributions. In fact the difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.32).
13 
A random-effects analysis of voting does not reject that there are no random-effects at the 
group level suggesting that voting decision are independent within groups (p-value=0.368 
without controls and p-value=0.181 when controlling by behavior in first part). 
  Table 4 shows the distribution of the 69 groups in the experiment across the four 
possible vote stage results: GroupMod, GroupNot, CompMod and CompNot. Of the 69 
groups in the experiment, 38 had their votes considered and 31 did not. Of the 38 groups 
that had their votes considered, 18 voted to modify payoffs and 20 voted not to modify 
payoffs (14 groups of these 38 groups had even split votes and the computer broke the tie 
6 times in favor of modification and 8 in favor of no modification). Of the 31 groups 
whose votes were not considered, the computer modified payoffs for 16 and did not 
modify payoffs for 15. Table 4 also presents this information by voteshare. Note that for 
voteshares from 1 to 3, there are at least four groups for each possible vote stage result, 
and that given the voting rules there can be no groups with GroupMod and voteshare less 
than 2 or groups with GroupNot and voteshare greater than 2. 
    
                                                 
12 See Coate and Morris (1995), and Dixit and Londregan (1995) on inefficient redistribution, and 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Alesina and Drazen (1991) on reform delays. 
13 Since the theoretical distribution is not continuous we do not use the usual Kolmogorov-Smirnov test but 
a modification proposed by Pettitt and Stephens (1977). The p-value is calculated by Monte Carlo 
simulation under the null that voteshare follows a binomial distribution with probability of success equal to 
the observed one (0.5326).   9
3.2. Exogenous versus endogenous treatment effect: group level analysis 
  In this section we examine the difference in outcomes between endogenous and 
exogenous policies. We refer to a policy as exogenous if it was imposed regardless of the 
votes of the subjects and we refer to it as endogenous if it was democratically chosen by 
the subjects. In this section we consider the group as the unit of analysis. This has the 
advantage that groups that voted in the same fashion (i.e. they have the same voteshare) 
should not systematically differ on unobservables but may differ in the result from the 
voting stage given the intervention of the computer. Of course, groups that had only one 
vote in favor of modification will never have an endogenous modification, but groups 
with even split vote (voteshare=2) may have any of the four vote stage results. Therefore, 
for the rest of this section we focus on groups with even split votes since they allow us to 
estimate the difference between exogenous and endogenous modification controlling for 
underlying characteristics of the groups since they are essentially the same. The evidence 
we present is consistent with the idea that that effect of the payoff modifications depends 
on whether the modification was endogenous or exogenous to the group. However, the 
result is not conclusive due to the statistical power of the analysis. 
  Table 5 shows the level of cooperation by the result of the voting stage and the 
vote share of the groups. There is little difference in the cooperation rates of groups with 
vote share 2 in part 1 (see panel A of Table 5). If anything, the groups with exogenous 
modification (CompMod) cooperated more in the first part of the experiment than those 
with endogenous modification (GroupMod) but this difference, as Table 6 shows, is not 
statistically significant (p-value 0.24).
14 Therefore, before the voting stage all groups 
were basically identical in terms of cooperation levels. 
  Focusing on groups with evenly split votes (voteshare=2), we observe first that 
the cooperation levels without modification are very similar between groups whose votes 
were considered (GroupNot) and those that were not (CompNot) after the voting stage: 
8.44% and 9.38% for endogenous and exogenous non-modification, respectively (panel B 
of Table 5). Second, groups with endogenous modification (GroupMod) had 51.67% 
cooperation after voting against 43.50% for the groups with exogenous modification 
(CompMod). The statistical significance of these differences is provided in Table 6. 
Third, there are no significant differences between GroupNot and CompNot. Therefore, 
to calculate the difference in treatment effects we can focus on the difference between 
GroupMod and CompMod. The difference of 8% in favor of endogenous modification 
                                                 
14 For all the statistical tests in this section we only consider one observation per group. In this case the 
observation is the average cooperation rate in the group in the first ten rounds of the experiment.    10
(GroupMod) versus exogenous modification (CompMod) is not always statistically 
significant. It is only significant at the 10% level if we eliminate from the analysis groups 
with subjects that did not remember the vote stage result. Finally, the payoff modification 
has a large effect on cooperation rates: a 43% and 34% increase for endogenous and 
exogenous modification. While this increase is always significant for endogenous 
modification (p-values less than 0.002, see Table 6) it is not significant for exogenous 
modification under all specifications.   
  Figure 3 shows the evolution of cooperation by round, voteshare and vote stage 
result. For groups with evenly split votes we see that cooperation rates for groups with 
payoff modification is always greater than for groups without modification. However, the 
difference between groups with endogenous and exogenous modification disappears after 
round 16. This suggests that we can learn about the difference in treatment effects by 
disaggregating the data by round. 
  If we focus on round 11 (the first round of the second part) we find a difference of 
16% in favor of endogenous modification (GroupMod) versus exogenous modification 
(CompMod) that is statistically significant at the 10% level without controls and at the 
5% level with controls or focusing on groups with subjects that remembered the vote 
stage result (see Table 7). In rounds 11 to 15 the difference between GroupMod and 
CompMod is also 16%. This difference is significant at the 10% levels with controls and 
at the 5% level if we focus on groups with subjects that remembered the vote stage result. 
However, there is no significant difference in rounds 16 to 20. 
  In the previous paragraphs, as in much of the paper, we focus on the effect of 
modification on behavior. But it is also interesting to study the effect over payoffs. Table 
8 shows the average payoffs by vote share, vote stage results and part of the experiment. 
Before the voting stage, payoffs are close to the mutual defection payoff (40) for all cells, 
as could be expected given the very low levels of cooperation (see Panel A). Note that 
payoffs are not monotonic in the percentage of cooperation as some cooperation may 
result in off the diagonal outcomes which add to less than the sum of payoffs under 
mutual defection. This explains why in Part 1 most cells have average payoffs slightly 
below 40 points. 
  After the voting stage, payoffs remain below or close to 40 for most cells. The 
exception is the groups with all votes in favor of modification and which were 
considered. These groups achieved payoffs which are significantly greater than 40 and 
not significantly different from 50 (the mutual cooperation payoff). Figure 4, left panel, 
shows the average payoff by group and their cooperation rate after the voting stage (the   11
two curves show the expected payoff by cooperation rate under modified and initial 
payoffs). It is clear that some groups with modification manage to reach levels of 
cooperation high enough for the payoffs to be greater than the payoffs under mutual 
defection. This is especially the case for groups with endogenous modification. Figure 4, 
right panel, shows the average payoffs by group before and after the voting stage. It is 
interesting to note that modification of payoffs results in an increase in the variance of 
average group payoffs and this effect is somewhat larger for endogenous modification. 
When the attempt to coordinate in mutual cooperation is successful, the modification of 
payoffs results in large payoffs. However, when this attempt fails, it results in payoffs 
well below the mutual defection payoffs. 
If we focus on groups with evenly split votes we find that groups with 
endogenous modification, in average, tend to have somewhat lower payoffs than groups 
with exogenous modification (see Table 8, panels B to E). In average the increase in 
cooperation due to endogenous modification is not enough to result in an increase in 
payoffs for these groups.  
  
3.3. Exogenous versus endogenous treatment effect: individual level analysis 
Studying the differences between the endogenous and the exogenous treatment 
effect with data at the group level has two disadvantages. First, only one observation is 
available per group and, second, only groups with vote shares 2 or greater can be used to 
look at the effects of the policy. In this section we study the experimental data at the 
individual level to assess the difference between endogenous and exogenous policies. Of 
course, the problem with individual data is that the subjects in groups with endogenous 
modification may be different from those in groups with exogenous modification because 
the former may have preferences for cooperative behavior that affect both cooperation 
and the decision to modify payoffs. In the presence of this type of selection, comparisons 
of cooperation levels between subjects in groups with endogenous and exogenous 
modifications can be misleading. 
To make this point explicit, and learn how to overcome it, we develop a simple 
formal framework. In particular, we consider a simplified game in which individuals are 
matched, they vote, they learn the mechanism used to select payoffs, they learn the 
payoffs, and then they play the stage game.
15 An individual i’s action in the stage game 
                                                 
15 In particular we abstract from the fact that players may have learned something about people in their 
group from the pre-play period.  This creates a potential inference problem, which we discuss below.    12
depends on the information available to him at that time. This information includes the 
mechanism  {} Comp Group M , ∈  that selected payoffs (group versus computer), the 
payoffs chosen  {} Not Mod P , ∈  (modified and non-modified), his or her vote  {} N Y vi , ∈ , 
and his type μi. Thus we may write the probability that subject i cooperates as  
(1)  () i i i v P M C μ , , ,.  
The type μi includes any personal characteristic that is unobserved to the researcher but 
that may be correlated with both the subject’s probability of cooperation and his or her 
voting decisions. For example, may have preferences for cooperative behavior that affect 
both cooperation and the decision to modify payoffs. In addition, subjects may differ on 
their expectations on how a modification of payoffs would results on mutual cooperation 
and hence may have different propensities to vote for modification and cooperate after a 
modification. 
The individual’s voting can only depend on his type, as he is randomly matched 
with the others and does not know their type or how they will vote 
(2) ( ) ii vv μ = . 
Further, (2) may be substituted into (1) to give, abusing notation, 
(3)  () i i P M C μ , ,.  
To test for differences in outcomes between endogenous and exogenous modification, we 
test whether, given P, actions are different by mechanism M (Group versus Comp). 
Consider, then the expected difference in behavior by selection mechanism and payoff 
structure: 
(4) 
() ()
() () () () [] ∫ −
= −
i i i i i i i
i i
d P Comp f P Comp C P Group f P Group C
P Comp C E P Group C E
μ μ μ μ μ , , , , , ,
, ,
 
where  () P M f i , μ . is the conditional density of the type given the selection mechanism 
and the payoff matrix.  Note further that P is informative about μ when payoffs are 
determined by voting but not when payoffs are determined by the computer and thus  
(5)  () () ( ) P Group f P Comp f f i i i , , μ μ μ ≠ = . 
Thus the difference (4) may be non-zero even if there are no differences in behavior by 
mechanism ( () ( ) P Group C P Comp C i i , , = ).  This inference problem is addressed in the   13
group analysis by picking the case where the vote is tied, in which case these densities in 
(5) are equal—but at a considerable loss of data as noted. 
This problem can be solved using individual-level data conditioning on both P 
and vi. This approach works because ( ) ( ) () i i i i i i v P f v P Comp f v P Group f , , , , , μ μ μ = = : 
once one knows how somebody votes, the payoffs are no longer informative about type 
under either computer or voter regimes. Thus,  
(5) 
() ()
() ( ) [] () ∫ −
= −
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i
d v P f v P Comp C v P Group C
v P Comp C E v P Group C E
μ μ μ μ , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
  
can only be non-zero if, for some positive measure set of types, behavior is different by 
mechanism.
16 Table 9 provides the data necessary to make this comparison.   
In the analysis of the experimental data we focus on the behavior in round 11 (the 
first round of part 2), because after this round the impact of the payoff modification on 
cooperation is not independent across subjects given that the actions of one player will 
affect the actions of the other players. Panel A in Table 9 shows the number of 
observations (subjects) by vote stage result and vote. The minimum number of 
observations in a cell is 17 and the maximum is 55.  
Panel B in Table 9 shows the percentage of cooperation at the beginning of part 2 
(round 11) by voting stage result and individual vote. Aggregating over the votes of the 
individuals we observe that subjects under endogenous modification cooperated more 
than subjects under exogenous modification: 72% against 50%. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value 0.003 – see Table 10). However, as 
discussed before, this difference is not an unbiased estimate of the difference in treatment 
effects. First, groups with endogenous modification have a larger share of subjects that 
voted for modification than groups with exogenous modification (see Table 9, panel A). 
Second, subjects who voted for modification are more likely to cooperate under 
modification than those who did not vote for modification (see Table 9, panel C). This 
may imply that there is an unobservable variable affecting both the vote of the individual, 
                                                 
16 The key condition here is that the votes of the other players are not correlated with a player’s type or with 
his vote. This is true given random assignment as long as individuals have no information about each other 
at the time of voting—something ruled out in our simplified example but possible in the actual experiment 
because of the pre-vote stages played by participants. We have shown using the same analytic methods that 
this problem can be addressed by conditioning on individual histories of play and payoffs in the pre-vote 
stages. Our analysis of the preliminary experimental data shows that, first, votes are statistically 
independent across members of each group and, second, our estimates are not affected by controlling for 
individual histories.   14
which affects the voting stage result of his or her group, and his or her behavior in part 2. 
Fortunately, we can obtain an unbiased estimate by controlling for how the individuals 
voted. 
Among individuals who voted for modification, those who experienced an 
endogenous modification of payoffs (GroupMod) had levels of cooperation of 82% while 
those who experienced an exogenous modification of payoffs (CompMod) only had 58%. 
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value 0.009 – Table 10, 
column 4). Among individuals who did not vote for modification, these levels are 41% 
and 42%, respectively and the difference is not statistically significant. These results are 
robust to controlling for own and observed behavior before the vote stage and eliminating 
subjects who did not remember the result of the voting stage. 
The effect of having your vote count (as in a democracy) can also be seen in 
Figure 5. Figure 5 shows the percentage of cooperation by vote stage result, round and 
individual vote. It is interesting to note that in round 11 cooperation generally increases. 
This result is presumably reflective of the well-known re-start effect in prisoner’s 
dilemma games (see Andreoni and Miller 1993). This jump tends to be larger for subjects 
that voted for modification, when payoffs are modified, and even larger when they are 
modified endogenously. Interestingly, the difference in cooperation rates between 
individuals under endogenous modification (GroupMod) and exogenous modification 
(CompMod) is not limited to round 11.  
Therefore, our experimental results show that there is an effect of democratic 
institutions in addition to the instrumental effect.  
  The analysis at the individual level also allows us to separate the total effect of an 
endogenous modification of payoffs into a selection effect and an endogenous treatment 
effect. In addition we can separate this endogenous treatment effect into an exogenous 
treatment and an endogeneity premium (the part of the endogenous treatment effect that 
cannot be explained by the exogenous treatment effect). 
  From the totals in the first two columns in panel C of Table 9 we can calculate the 
difference between the cooperation rates for GroupMod and GroupNot and find that the 
total effect of an endogenous modification on cooperation is of 55%. Note that the totals 
of these columns can be calculated as weighted averages of the cooperation rates by type 
of vote if we use as weights the proportion of subjects that voted for and against 
modification. If we denote the proportion of subjects that voted for  {} N Y v , ∈  given the 
payoff structure  {} Not Mod P , ∈  and the mechanism  { } Comp Group M , ∈  as  () M P v f ,    15
and  () M P v C ,  as the proportion of cooperation, the total effect is: 
() () ( ) ( )
{} ∑
∈
− =
N Y v
Not Group v C Not Group v f Mod Group v C Mod Group v f TE
,
, , , ,.
17 
  The selection effect must capture the changes in cooperation that arise not from 
the change in treatment but from the change in the proportion of types of subjects. Thus, 
the selection effect can be measured as: 
() () () ( )
{} ∑
∈
− =
N Y v
Not Group v C Not Group v f Mod Group v f SE
,
, , ,.  
From Table 9 we can calculate the selection effect as a 4% increase in the cooperation 
rate.
18 
  The endogenous treatment effect must correspond to changes in cooperation due 
to an endogenous change in the payoff matrix and not due to changes in the proportion of 
the different types of voters. In addition the endogenous treatment effect must be equal to 
the difference between the total effect and the selection effect. Thus, the endogenous 
treatment effect is: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
{} ∑
∈
− =
N Y v
Not Group v C Mod Group v C Mod Group v f EndoTrE
,
, , ,.  
From Table 9 we can calculate the endogenous treatment effect as almost 51%.
19 
  The data on the effect of exogenously imposing the modification of payoffs allow 
us to calculate the exogenous treatment effect. In this way we are able to separate the 
endogenous treatment effect into the exogenous part and an endogenous premium.   The 
exogenous treatment corresponds to the change in cooperation due to an exogenous 
modification of payoffs. As such we must leave the weights of the average constant. 
Moreover, these weights must be consistent with the ones used to calculate the 
endogenous treatment effect. Thus, we can calculate the exogenous treatment effect as: 
() ( ) ( ) ()
{} ∑
∈
− =
N Y v
Not Comp v C Mod Comp v C Mod Group v f ExoTrE
,
, , , . 
From Table 9 we can calculate the exogenous treatment effect as 35%.
20 Therefore, the 
difference between the exogenous and endogenous treatment effect, the endogeneity 
premium, is 16%.  
                                                 
17 The total effect can be calculated from Table 8 as follows: TE=((17/72)41.18+(55/72)81.82)-
((55/80)14.55+(25/80)24)=55. 
18 SE=(17/72-55/80)14.55+(55/72-25/80)24=4. 
19 EndoTrE=(17/72)(41.18-14.55)+(55/72)(81.82-24)=51. 
20 ExoTrE=(17/72)(41.94-3.85)+(55/72)(57.58-23.53)=35.   16
  The total effect from endogenous modification of payoffs can be separated in 
three components: one, the selection effect; two, the exogenous treatment effect; and 
three, the endogeneity premium. Our estimates show that in this case the selection effect 
explains 8% of the change in behavior, the exogenous treatment explains 64% and the 
endogeneity premium explains 28%. Our results show that the difference between the 
two types of treatment effects is of importance: first, the endogeneity premium is more 
than three times the size of the selection effect and more than 40% of the exogenous 
treatment effect. These calculations suggest the importance of distinguishing the source 
of treatment effect when studying the impact of institutions or policies on behavior.  
 
Conclusions 
Previous literature has suggested that democratic institutions could have an 
intrinsic effect in addition to their instrumental effect. However, it has been empirically 
difficult to provide unambiguous evidence for such an effect. In this paper we present 
results from an experiment in which we can measure the intrinsic effect of democracy. 
We show that the effect of a given policy (a tax on unilateral defection in a social 
dilemma) on behavior depends on whether it was democratically chosen or not. This 
experimental result supports the idea that democracy may have an intrinsic effect on 
behavior in addition to the effect that democracy may have due to the choice of different 
policies. More generally, our results stress that a treatment effect may depend on whether 
the treatment is endogenous or exogenous –what we refer to as the “endogeneity 
premium.” 
Understanding the forces that generate this “endogeneity premium” in our 
experiments remains for future work. One hypothesis is that an endogenous modification 
affects behavior because it reveals to the subjects that the group voted for modification, 
affecting the subjects’ beliefs about others’ future behavior, and thus affecting their 
behavior. A second hypothesis is that it is the endogeneity itself which affects behavior. 
Knowing that the policy was imposed by the decision of the group may directly affect 
subjects’ behavior. For example, endogenous modification may strengthen the 
establishment of a cooperative social norm. Future experimental work will help us 
distinguish between these two hypotheses and provide an explanation for the difference 
between endogenous and exogenous treatment effects in our social dilemma experiments.   17
References 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic 
Review 91(5), 1369-401. 
Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991). “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?,” American 
Economic Review 81(5), 1170-88. 
Andreoni, J., W.T. Harbaugh and L. Vesterlund (2003). “The Carrot or the Stick: 
Rewards, Punishments and Cooperation,” American Economic Review, 93(3), 
893-902 
Andreoni, J. and J.H. Miller (1993). "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated 
Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal 103(4), 570-
85. 
Aoyagi, M., and G. Fréchette (2003). “Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect 
Public Monitoring,” HBS, mimeo. 
Bardhan, P. (2000). “Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation 
Communities in South India,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 
48(4), 847-65. 
Bereby Meyer, Y. and A.E. Roth (2006). "The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: 
Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation," American 
Economic Review 96(4), 1029-42. 
Besley, T., R. Pande and V. Rao (2005) “Political Selection and the Quality of 
Government: Evidence from South India”, Yale University, Economic Growth 
Center WP 921. 
Bonin, J.P., D. Jones, and L. Putterman (1993) “Theoretical and Empirical Research on 
Producers’ Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?” Journal of Economic 
Literature 31, 1290-1320. 
Bosch-Domènech, A., J.G. Montalvo, R. Nagel and A. Satorra (2002). "One, Two, 
(Three), Infinity, ….: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments," 
American Economic Review 92(5), 1687-1701. 
Botelho, A., G. Harrison, L.M. Costa Pinto and E.E. Rutström (2005). “Social Norms and 
Social Choice,” unpublished paper, Dept. of Economics, University of Central 
Florida. 
Cachon, G.P. and C.F. Camerer (1996). “Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in 
Experimental Coordination Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(1), 
165-194. 
Charness G., G. R. Fréchette, and C.-Z. Qin (2006) “Endogenous Transfers in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Experimental Test Of Cooperation And 
Coordination,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. 
Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995). “On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests,” Journal 
of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35.   18
Cooper, R.W., DeJong, D.V., Forsythe, R. and Ross, T.W. (1990). “Selection Criteria in 
Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results,” American Economic 
Review, 80(1), 218-33. 
Cooper, R., D.V. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T.W. Ross (1992). "Forward induction in 
coordination games," Economic Letters 40, 167-172. 
Cooper, R., D.V. DeJong, R. Forsythe and T.W. Ross (1996). "Cooperation without 
Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Games 
and Economic Behavior 12(2), 187-218. 
Dal Bó, P. (2005). “Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence 
from infinitely repeated games,” American Economic Review 95(5), 1591-
1604. 
Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1995). “Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency,” 
American Political Science Review 89(4), 856-66. 
Duffy, J. and J. Ochs (2003). “Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social 
Interaction,” University of Pittsburgh, mimeo. 
Ertan, A., T. Page and L. Putterman (2005). “Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions 
Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment?,” mimeo. 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2003). “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments 
Influence Economics Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics 50(1) 3-
39. 
Falkinger, J., E. Fehr, S. Gächter and R. Winter-Ebmer (2000). “A Simple Mechanism 
for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence,” 
American Economic Review 90, 247-264. 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000). “Cooperation and Punishment,” American Economic 
Review 90, 980-94. 
Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991). "Resistance Against Reform: Status Quo Bias in the 
Presence of Individual Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review 
81(5), 1146-55. 
Finkel, S. E. (1985). “Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel 
Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science 29, 891-913. 
Fogel, R. (1977). “Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of “Voice” and 
Improvement on Experienced Inequity,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 35(2), 108-19. 
Foster, A.D. and M.R. Rosenzweig (2005), “Democratization, Decentralization and the 
Distribution of Local Public Goods in a Poor Rural Economy”, Brown 
University, manuscript. 
Frey, B. S. (1998). “Institutions and morale: the crowding-out effect,” in Ben-Ner, A. and 
Putterman, L., ed., Economics, values, and organization. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Kagel, J.H. and A.E. Roth, editors (1995). The Handbook of Experimental Economics. 
Princeton University Press.   19
La Porta, R., F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1998). “Law and Finance,” 
Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113-1155. 
Ledyard, J. (1995). “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,” pp. 111-94 in 
John Kagel and Alvin Roth, eds., Handbook of Experimental Economics. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Levine, D. I. and L.D. Tyson (1990). "Participation, Productivity, and the Firm’s 
Environment," in A. Blinder, ed., Paying for Productivity: A Look at the 
Evidence.  Washington: Brookings Institution. 
Lind, E.A. and T.R. Tyler (1988). The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. New 
York: Plenum Press. 
North, D.C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton and 
Co. 
Palfrey, T.R. (2005). “Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy,” mimeo. 
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pettitt, A.N. and M.A. Stephens (1977). “The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit 
Statistic with Discrete and Grouped Data,” Technometrics 19(2), 205-210. 
Palacios Huerta, I. (2003). “Learning to Open Monty Hall’s Doors,” Experimental 
Economics 6, 235-51.  
Sutter, M., S. Haigner and M.G. Kocher (2005). “Choosing the stick or the carrot? 
Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations,” mimeo. 
Thibaut, J. and L. Walker (1975). Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis. New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Thomson, D. (1970). The Democratic Citizen: social science and democratic theory in 
the twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de (1838). Democracy in America. New York : Adlard and Saunders. 
Van den Bos, K. (1999). “What Are We Talking about When We Talk about No-Voice 
Procedures? On the Psychology of the Fair Outcome Effect,” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 35, 560-77. 
Van Huyck, J.B., R.C. Battalio and R. Beil (1990). “Tacit Cooperation Games, Strategic 
Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure,” American Economic Review, 80(1), 
234-48. 
Van Huyck, J.B., R.C. Battalio and R. Beil (1993). “Asset Markets as an Equilibrium 
Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit 
Communication,” Games and Economic Behavior 5, 485-504. 
 Table 2: Summary statistics of sessions
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Date 3/5/06 10/5/06 12/5/06 15/5/06 15/5/06 13/7/06 18/9/06 18/9/06 13/10/06
Subjects 20 16 16 20 12 12 12 16 24
Econo 10.00% 6.25% 12.50% 15.00% 16.67% 16.67% 33.33% 25.00% 8.33%
Class 1.90 1.63 2.19 2.45 2.42 3.25 2.08 2.13 2.08
Political Philosophy 2.26 2.00 2.36 2.11 1.91 2.09 1.91 2.43 2.21
SAT Math 730.79 697.33 736.88 734.00 662.73 706.36 743.33 711.88 720.87
SAT Verbal 723.16 728.67 720.00 736.00 689.00 720.91 717.50 681.25 723.48
Guess Number 39.20 37.94 39.50 38.75 42.25 44.00 38.08 49.63 31.92
Questions
   Vote stage 80.00% 81.25% 93.75% 100.00% 100.00% 91.67% 100.00% 81.25% 91.67%
   Initial Payoffs 90.00% 93.75% 81.25% 85.00% 100.00% 91.67% 83.33% 81.25% 95.83%
   Modified Payoffs 65.00% 75.00% 62.50% 70.00% 91.67% 58.33% 91.67% 93.75% 100.00%
Earnings
   Maximum 29.00 28.20 29.40 28.20 28.20 28.60 26.40 28.20 28.68
   Average 24.44 24.23 24.86 24.42 24.78 24.35 24.16 23.62 25.51
   Minimum 20.60 20.40 20.60 20.80 21.80 20.40 19.20 17.60 20.80
Session 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 All Sessions
Date 20/10/06 23/10/06 27/10/06 30/10/06 06/11/06 10/11/06 17/11/06 20/11/06 27/11/06
Subjects 12 20 8 16 16 12 12 12 20 276
Econo 33.33% 10.00% 12.50% 18.75% 0.00% 8.33% 0.00% 16.67% 10.00% 13.41%
Class 2.00 1.85 1.88 1.50 1.81 2.00 1.83 1.75 1.80 2.02
Political Philosophy 2.25 2.00 1.86 2.00 2.00 1.91 2.08 1.92 1.95 2.09
SAT Math 732.50 746.67 733.75 734.00 722.00 758.33 662.73 764.17 728.00 724.91
SAT Verbal 721.67 718.89 736.25 737.33 724.67 728.33 750.00 730.83 729.50 723.21
Guess Number 35.92 37.10 28.63 37.56 30.44 28.67 47.25 37.00 35.30 37.68
Questions
   Vote stage 91.67% 95.00% 100.00% 87.50% 87.50% 100.00% 91.67% 100.00% 95.00% 92.03%
   Initial Payoffs 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 81.25% 81.25% 100.00% 66.67% 75.00% 95.00% 89.13%
   Modified Payoffs 75.00% 85.00% 100.00% 75.00% 68.75% 100.00% 41.67% 100.00% 95.00% 80.43%
Earnings
   Maximum 26.40 28.40 26.80 27.60 27.60 26.60 27.64 28.20 29.36 29.40
   Average 24.50 24.41 25.49 24.36 24.15 24.45 24.17 25.83 24.75 24.57
   Minimum 21.80 19.80 23.40 20.20 20.76 21.48 20.56 22.00 19.60 17.60
Note: Econ: percentage of Econ majors in the session, Class: 1=Freshmen to 4=Senior, Political Philosophy: 1=Verly Liberal to 5=Very Conservative.Table 3: Determinants of Voting
Dependent Variable: Votemod
(1) (2) (3) (8) (7) (6) (5) (4) (9)
Own Part 1 Coop. 0.46992 0.6727
[0.16149]*** [0.16978]***
Partners' Part 1 Coop. -0.41933 -0.76222
[0.21150]** [0.22159]***
Class -0.02868 -0.01922
[0.02723] [0.02777]
Number -0.00331 -0.00369
[0.00152]** [0.00157]**
Verbal 0.00073 0.00021
[0.00046] [0.00049]
Math 0.00117 0.0017
[0.00045]*** [0.00050]***
Econ 0.07158 -0.00098
[0.08836] [0.08941]
Political 0.0032 0.02922
[0.04093] [0.03982]
Constant 0.44816 0.60797 0.59049 0.65725 0.01006 -0.31198 0.52301 0.51694 -0.73271
[0.04152]*** [0.04838]*** [0.06264]*** [0.06477]*** [0.33377] [0.32411] [0.03235]*** [0.09101]*** [0.45382]
Observations 276 276 276 276 265 266 276 254 246
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.03 0 0 0.15
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 4: Number of Groups by Vote Stage Results and Vote Share
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot) Total
0 X300 3
1 X954 1 8
2 6854 2 3
3 5X66 1 7
4 7X01 8
Total 18 20 16 15 69
Table 5: The effect of democracy - Group Level Data
Panel A: Cooperation Percentage in Part 1
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 19.17%
1 X 21.39% 31.00% 11.25%
2 11.25% 16.88% 16.50% 16.88%
3 12.00% X 17.92% 19.58%
4 20.36% X 10.00%
Panel B: Cooperation Percentage in Part 2
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 21.67%
1 X 11.67% 24.50% 12.50%
2 51.67% 8.44% 43.50% 9.38%
3 48.00% X 32.50% 12.50%
4 88.93% X 7.50%
Panel C: Cooperation Percentage in Round 11
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 16.67%
1 X 19.44% 50.00% 12.50%
2 66.67% 15.63% 50.00% 0.00%
3 55% X 50.00% 25.00%
4 89.29% X 25.00%
Panel D: Cooperation Percentage in Rounds 11 to 15
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 26.67%
1 X 15.56% 30.00% 18.75%
2 62.50% 11.88% 47.00% 10.00%
3 52% X 40.83% 17.50%
4 90.00% X 15.00%
Panel E: Cooperation Percentage in Rounds 16 to 20
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 16.67%
1 X 7.78% 19.00% 6.25%
2 40.83% 5.00% 40.00% 8.75%
3 44% X 24.17% 7.50%
4 87.86% X 0.00%
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider VotesTable 6: The effect of democracy - Group level data - Voteshare=2
Dependent Variable: Cooperation rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Part 1 Part 2 Part 2 Part 2 Part 2
GroupMod 0.1125 0.51667 0.40392 0.5375 0.44952
[0.02933]*** [0.09036]*** [0.11692]*** [0.09405]*** [0.12261]***
GroupNot 0.16875 0.08438 -0.08475 0.07857 -0.04712
[0.02540]*** [0.07825] [0.13857] [0.07109] [0.13374]
CompMod 0.165 0.435 0.26963 0.3 0.19002
[0.03213]*** [0.09898]*** [0.14859]* [0.09405]*** [0.13635]
CompNot 0.16875 0.09375 -0.07538 0.10833 -0.01484
[0.03593]*** [0.11066] [0.15805] [0.10860] [0.15495]
Part 1 Cooperation 1.00223 0.70387
[0.68652] [0.63633]
Exclude did not remember 
vote result No No No Yes Yes
Observations 23 23 23 18 18
R-squared 0.85 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.78
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Tests of differences of cooperation rates by mechanism (Group versus Comp) and payoffs (Mod versus Not)
p-values
GroupNot=CompNot 1 0.9456 0.944 0.822 0.806
GroupMod=CompMod 0.2424 0.5495 0.3334 0.0958 0.0738
GroupMod=GroupNot 0.1635 0.0018 0.0009 0.0016 0.0013
CompMod=CompNot 0.9388 0.0331 0.0279 0.2035 0.1756
GroupMod-GroupNot = 
CompMod-CompNot 0.4068 0.6384 0.4562 0.1724 0.1402
Note: GroupNot: endogenous modification, GroupNot: endogenous non-modification,
         CompMod: exogenous modification, ComNot: exogenous non-modification.Table 7: The effect of democracy - Group level data - Voteshare=2
Dependent Variable: Cooperation rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Round 11 Round 11 Round 11 Round 11 Round 11-15 Round 11-15 Round 11-15 Round 11-15 Round 16-20 Round 16-20 Round 16-20 Round 16-20
GroupMod 0.66667 0.55736 0.6875 0.57233 0.625 0.49734 0.6375 0.52175 0.40833 0.31049 0.4375 0.37729
[0.06286]*** [0.07668]*** [0.07629]*** [0.09164]*** [0.08306]*** [0.10413]*** [0.08969]*** [0.11184]*** [0.10467]*** [0.13892]** [0.11146]*** [0.14979]**
GroupNot 0.15625 -0.00772 0.14286 -0.02167 0.11875 -0.07274 0.11429 -0.05108 0.05 -0.09676 0.04286 -0.04316
[0.05444]*** [0.09087] [0.05767]** [0.09996] [0.07193] [0.12341] [0.06780] [0.12200] [0.09065] [0.16463] [0.08425] [0.16339]
CompMod 0.5 0.33968 0.4375 0.29354 0.47 0.28277 0.35 0.20531 0.4 0.2565 0.25 0.17473
[0.06886]*** [0.09744]*** [0.07629]*** [0.10191]** [0.09099]*** [0.13234]** [0.08969]*** [0.12438] [0.11466]*** [0.17654] [0.11146]** [0.16658]
CompNot 0 -0.16397 0 -0.16124 0.1 -0.09149 0.1 -0.06206 0.0875 -0.05926 0.11667 0.03237
[0.07699] [0.10365] [0.08809] [0.11581] [0.10172] [0.14076] [0.10356] [0.14134] [0.12819] [0.18778] [0.12870] [0.18930]
Part 1 Cooperation 0.97165 0.92136 1.13476 0.92603 0.8697 0.4817
[0.45023]** [0.47558]* [0.61144]* [0.58045] [0.81568] [0.77742]
Exclude did not remember 
vote result No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 23 23 18 18 23 23 18 18 23 23 18 18
R-squared 0.9 0.92 0.9 0.92 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.6 0.62 0.61 0.62
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Tests of differences of cooperation rates by mechanism (Group versus Comp) and payoffs (Mod versus Not)
p-values
GroupNot=CompNot 0.1139 0.0871 0.1963 0.1708 0.882 0.8748 0.9098 0.927 0.8138 0.8133 0.6388 0.6392
GroupMod=CompMod 0.0898 0.0244 0.0361 0.0152 0.2236 0.0914 0.0398 0.022 0.9578 0.7405 0.254 0.236
GroupMod=GroupNot 0 0 0.0001 0 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.018 0.0118 0.0135 0.0143
CompMod=CompNot 0.0001 0 0.0021 0.0009 0.0139 0.0093 0.0894 0.0612 0.085 0.082 0.4466 0.4299
GroupMod-GroupNot = 
CompMod-CompNot 0.9382 0.6255 0.4889 0.3341 0.4464 0.259 0.1455 0.0946 0.8378 0.6879 0.2552 0.2421
Note: GroupNot: endogenous modification, GroupNot: endogenous non-modification, CompMod: exogenous modification, ComNot: exogenous non-modification.Table 8: The effect of democracy - Group Level Data
Panel A: Payoffs in Part 1
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 39.08
1 X 38.97 39.70 38.88
2 39.04 38.69 39.15 38.56
3 39.20 X 39.38 39.54
4 39.25 X 40.00
Panel B: Payoffs in Part 2
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 38.50
1 X 39.06 35.89 38.75
2 37.43 39.28 40.67 39.06
3 40.64 X 38.45 38.75
4 46.72 X 39.25
Panel C: Payoffs in Round 11
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 38.33
1 X 39.17 32.20 38.75
2 38.67 38.44 35.40 40.00
3 37.50 X 39.67 37.50
4 47.79 X 37.50
Panel D: Payoffs in Rounds 11 to 15
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 38.00
1 X 38.67 34.68 38.13
2 37.98 39.06 39.90 39.00
3 39.44 X 36.88 38.25
4 46.26 X 38.50
Panel E: Payoffs in Rounds 16 to 20
Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Vote Share (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
0 X 39.00
1 X 39.44 37.10 39.38
2 36.88 39.50 41.44 39.13
3 41.84 X 40.02 39.25
4 47.19 X 40.00
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider VotesTable 9: The effect of the democracy - Individual Level Data
Panel A: Number of observations
Vote for Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Modify (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
No 17 55 31 26
Yes 55 25 33 34
Total 72 80 64 60
Panel B: Cooperation Percentage in Round 11
Vote for Modify Not Modify Modify Not Modify
Modify (GroupMod) (GroupNot) (CompMod) (CompNot)
No 41.18% 14.55% 41.94% 3.85%
Yes 81.82% 24.00% 57.58% 23.53%
Total 72.22% 17.50% 50.00% 15.00%
Consider Votes Not Consider Votes
Consider Votes Not Consider VotesTable 10: The effect of the democracy - Individual Level Data
Dependent Variable: Cooperation rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Round 11 Round 11 Round 11 Round 11 Round 11
GroupMod 0.72222
[0.05035]***
GroupNot 0.175
[0.04776]***
CompMod 0.5
[0.05340]***
CompNot 0.15
[0.05515]***
GroupModn 0.41176 0.36246 0.4 0.3528
[0.10090]*** [0.10152]*** [0.10584]*** [0.10642]***
GroupNotn 0.14545 0.05037 0.13725 0.05754
[0.05610]** [0.06740] [0.05740]** [0.06892]
CompModn 0.41935 0.31401 0.4 0.31579
[0.07472]*** [0.08560]*** [0.07484]*** [0.08626]***
CompNotn 0.03846 -0.01583 0.04545 -0.00122
[0.08159] [0.08364] [0.08739] [0.08960]
GroupMody 0.81818 0.71881 0.84906 0.76254
[0.05610]*** [0.06299]*** [0.05631]*** [0.06370]***
GroupNoty 0.24 0.08966 0.27273 0.13353
[0.08320]*** [0.09006] [0.08739]*** [0.09494]
CompMody 0.57576 0.43065 0.63333 0.50218
[0.07242]*** [0.08241]*** [0.07484]*** [0.08547]***
CompNoty 0.23529 0.11202 0.22581 0.12062
[0.07135]*** [0.07856] [0.07362]*** [0.08011]
Own Part 1 Coop. 0.6176 0.56907
[0.13941]*** [0.14074]***
Partners' Part 1 Coop. -0.03396 -0.06618
[0.17930] [0.18074]
Exclude did not remember 
vote result No No No Yes Yes
Observations 276 276 276 254 254
R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.6 0.6 0.62
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Tests of differences of cooperation rates by mechanism (Group versus Comp) and payoffs 
p-values
GroupNot=CompNot 0.7321
GroupMod=CompMod 0.0027
GroupMod=GroupNot 0
CompMod=CompNot 0
GroupMod-GroupNot = 
CompMod-CompNot 0.0577
GroupNotn=CompNotn 0.2808 0.4941 0.3808 0.5663
GroupModn=CompModn 0.9518 0.6938 1 0.7717
GroupModn=GroupNotn 0.0218 0.0059 0.03 0.0128
CompModn=CompNotn 0.0007 0.0026 0.0023 0.0055
GroupModn-GroupNotn = 
CompModn-CompNotn 0.4742 0.9106 0.582 0.8951
GroupNoty=CompNoty 0.9658 0.8336 0.6817 0.9078
GroupMody=CompMody 0.0086 0.0014 0.0221 0.005
GroupMody=GroupNoty 0000
CompMody=CompNoty 0.0009 0.0014 0.0001 0.0002
GroupMody-GroupNoty = 
CompMody-CompNoty 0.0972 0.0266 0.2544 0.0892
Note: GroupNot: endogenous modification, GroupNot: endogenous non-modification,
         CompMod: exogenous modification, ComNot: exogenous non-modification,
          n and y denote the individual vote of the subject (against or for modification).Vote
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Figure 3: Cooperation by Round, Vote Stage Results and Vote Share3
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Figure 4: Part 2 Payoffs0
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Figure 5: Cooperation by Round, Vote Stage Results and Individual Vote